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Introduction
The development of the navy and the extension of connected capacities is one 
of the focuses of the military evolution in the People’s Republic of China (lat-
er on: China). The directions of the improvement appear to be clear, though 
achieving their aims are a question of decades, not years. These Chinese steps, 
the progress they make, new ship classes they develop, advanced technologies 
they produce will take the upcoming decades to reach their goals – even if 
sometimes the Western media exaggerates the potential threat posed by the 
Chinese army. 
The paper shortly presents the geopolitical environment of the country, af-
ter that analyses the necessity of a blue-water navy, the development they have 
already started and tries to project ahead their capacities and the relevance of 
that future Navy.
Geopolitical Environment
Although China is not a landlocked country, its potential to enter the world 
market is limited – to the South China Sea, through which Beijing can facili-
tate its trade. The historical ties, political realities made it harder (or even im-
possible) for China to trade through mainland neighbours: the break-up with 
the Soviet Union (including Central Asia) closed the routes towards Europe, 
the relations with India made it impossible to use southern ways, the situation 
in Southeast Asia and the location of South Korea, Japan and the presence of 
the US Army in these countries let no other option for Beijing. 
Graph 1. China’s Geopolitical Environment 
Source: cdn.shopify.com, edited by the author
So the South China Sea and the maritime trade routes are exceptionally im-
portant for China, especially in the recent decades, achieving outstanding eco-
nomic successes. To fuel its economy and to supply the oil consumption of the 
80 The Project under the Registration Number “EFOP-3.6.3-VEKOP-16-2017-00007” named “From a Tal-
ent to a Young Researcher – Supporting Activities of the Researcher Career in Higher Education” is 
co-funded by the European Union in the framework of the Széchenyi 2020 Program.
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terribly growing number of cars, China imports from various oil exporters of 
the world, among the biggest are Saudi Arabia, Angola,81 Iran, Oman, Iraq, 
Sudan and Russia. Although Beijing imports oil via pipelines from Russia and 
Central Asia, approximately the 80% of the imports arrive on China’s most 
important trade route on the Indian Ocean via the South China Sea. Of course 
it is not just about raw materials. China can reach the market with its export 
goods through the Indian Ocean as well. 
Beijings feels, its trade through the Ocean is vulnerable and would be in 
danger during a global crisis. 
Beijing has several national and international objectives according to its 
maritime trade routes. First of all, it is elemental to secure these waterways to 
feed the economy to maintain the economic growth (and the supremacy of the 
Communist Party). To reach this, Beijing supports the principle of the free 
waterways, but its main sea line of communication (SLOC) is vulnerable. This 
trade route erecting from African, European and Middle Eastern markets via 
the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait (or other Straits in the region) 
and the South China Sea is threatened by several actors. The South China Sea 
is important for China as a Gate to the raw materials and also as a potential oil 
and gas producer area, and the shipping through the sea is endangered by the 
different claims of the countries in the region. The Malacca Strait as a narrow 
route is dangerous because of pirates and the closing of the Strait would add 
expensive extra kilometers to the route. Beijing fears that its objectives will be 
jeopardised by the emerging India on the Indian Ocean, and the trade route 
is also under threat at the Strait of Hormuz and at the Horn of Africa where 
piracy is ’crucial’ than ever. 
Recently China’s ability to defend and secure its SLOC is limited, the Chi-
nese Navy is still limited in size, scope and equipment and Beijing is unable to 
maintain presence far from its borders, especially on international waters. To 
solve its weaknesses, China cooperates with regional countries to secure the 
routes, develops additional trade routes to diversificate and builds up interna-
tional ports and bases that could be used for Chinese vessels to dock and to 
control the waters and routes. But their ultimate goal is to be able to react by 
their own, with the help of their well-equipped navy.82
Cooperation or Uncertainty
While international cooperation can guarantee the safety of the trade routes, as 
the reaction of global actors on piracy at Somalia shows83, a global power has to 
be able to react by his own -  the traditionalist view claims in China. This logic 
still builds upon Alfred Mahan’s view on Sea Power, and the mahan’s logic is 
still recognisable at the Chinese Navy (Till, 2012: 66). According to this view, 
the powerful navy you have, the easier it is to control and use freely the waters. 
81 Besenyő 2007.
82 This sections already published: Vörös 2012. See more about this maritime trade route in that paper.
83 See more: Besenyő – Kiss 2009; Vörös 2012. 
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“Whether they will or not, Americans must now begin to look outward. 
The growing production of the country demands it.” – a quote origi-
nating from Alfred Mahan from the late 19th, early 20th century. Just 
replace ’Americans’ with ’Chinese’ and the outdated mahan’s logic intro-
duces itself. 
Graph 2. Trade route through the Indian Ocean 
Source: Edited by the author
On one hand, the need to secure trade routes is understandable. In case of 
an international crisis, disruption of trade could danger the economy and the 
political system. On the other hand, uncertainty is not just a one-way street: 
growing number of fregatts and submarines on one side means growing fear 
and uncertainty on the other. And that spiral may lead to conflicts. About un-
certainty I have already noted: 
“China has growing influence on shipping lanes throughout the Indian 
ocean, leading several countries to express unease about the safety of 
oil and supply shipments in the region. Beijing wants to safeguard its 
maritime lines of trade, and to reach this aim, they started to develop 
a blue-water navy. [China] faces with the emerging India looking for 
the same sources, with Delhi developing and upgrading its navy. India’s 
situation and aspirations are similar to Beijing’s. India also has a rapidly 
developing economy and also relies heavily on imported oil and as es-
timates suggests, Delhi would need to import more than 90% of its oil 
demand in two decades.”84 
As we will see, Beijing is not refusing cooperation, but the goals of their de-
velopments are undoubtedly pointing towards a future, where they are able to 
defend their sea line of communications by their own. 
84 Vörös 2012.
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Army Development
The development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a complex, ongoing 
process, started in the 80s realizing their army falling behind international 
standards. The improvement is slow, complex (focusing on the technologies, 
training, on the Navy, Air Force, etc.) and there are endless number of mo-
nographies and papers about it. What is important for us, is the scale of this 
development, the reactions, and the share of the Navy, especially the evolution 
of the blue-water capacities. 
The military budget of China is growing in a shocking way, with 10-16% 
per year85, serving ammunition for western websites and news centers about 
the threat China poses. The facts, that the military budget of the country is 
still less than half of the US’s expenditures, or that the money they are spend-
ing on the army, is proportionally less from year to year, according to their 
total expenditures86, are not really mentioned. 
Of course, the pace of the growing is huge and there is the possibility that 
the official figures are far from the truth: the defense spending is far from 
transparent, the official numbers don’t include such categories of expenditure 
(expenses for strategic forces, military-related research and development, etc.) 
which should be included in these numbers. The real budget can be 40-72% 
higher, than the official numbers.87
Graph 3. Chinese Military Budget 
Source: janes.com
One thing is clear from the development: we cannot expect dramatic changes, 
China’s plans are for the long term, and the whole process may take several 
decades. The question is not if China is going to have a blue-water navy, but 
when and what quality they are going to have. 
They are building up capacities (mostly by their own), which can defend 
the country and their trade routes from non-traditional threats. As Kang Geng, 
the political commissar of the South Fleet said in 2009: “China has thousands 
of enterprises spreading over the globe. We must seriously consider how to 
effectively protect [them]”88.
85 Liff – Erickson 2013: 808.
86 Liff – Erickson 2013: 809.
87 Vörös 2014.
88 Till 2012: 224.
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China’s New Defense White Paper, 2015
On 26th May 2015 Chinese government released its newest defense white pa-
per, entitled ’China’s Military Strategy’. As Caitlin Campbell Senior Policy 
Analyst from US Security and Foreign Affairs notes in her brief, although these 
White Papers, public strategies published by nation states and international 
actors are there to make their developments transparent and their steps clear 
and less threatening, this White Paper “contains no major revelations about 
China’s military strategy or modernization”.89 
On the other hand, there are some interesting points about the changing 
strategic thinking. The White Paper rejects the priority of mainland capacities, 
turns towards maritime military in relation with seas and oceans.90 The Paper 
introduces the concept of active defense, communicating that they have rec-
ognized the new threats “and anticipates its most likely conflict scenarios will 
take place at sea”.91 Campbell introduces the active defense concept as well: 
“According to the DWP, <the strategic concepts of active defense> are 
<adherence to the unity of strategic defense and operational and tac-
tical offense; adherence to the principles of defense, self-defense and 
post-emptive strike; and adherence to the stance that ‘we will not attack 
unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.’>”.92
Modernization of the Navy – Focusing on the Blue-water 
capacities
The history of the Navy (People’s Liberation Army Navy - PLAN) started in 
1949 – but its role remained limited thanks to the doctrine, prioritizing regu-
lar forces. Modernizatory processes are originating from the 80s, focusing on 
homeland construction capacity and technology in order to create active pres-
ence on regional waters. Blue-water goals were among the future plans. 
The first decades of development were slow and inefficient – the lack of doc-
trinal background and the still prioritized regular army blocked the renewal of 
the Navy. As we could see, on doctrinal level the change was slow and just in 
the recent years they realized the importance of the Navy.
The evolution of the PLAN is also a slow, but more and more successful 
process. Military and navy officials decided about parallel progress, buying 
new technologies (from abroad) and initiating Chinese production capacity.  
Development started with the renewal of destroyer and frigate class ships. 
89 Campbell 2015: 1.
90 Háda 2015: 4.
91 Campbell 2015: 1.
92 Campbell 2015: 1.
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“Chinese destroyers lacked the AAW capability to defend themselves be-
yond the range of land-based anti-aircraft missile batteries. With this 
in mind, China did not possess a ‘blue water’ navy. In order to expand 
the effective range of its naval forces and to acquire the ability to project 
power farther out to sea, the PLAN needed modern warships that could 
both protect themselves and defeat an opponent.”93 
Beside buying two Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia, the production 
of their new destroyer-class, Type 051 had started. Type 051-class ships (a total 
of 16) were never competitive, lacked modern technologies – but helped the 
PLAN in one way: providing precious information and experience in produc-
tion. The next class was the Type 052, with several sub-classes (like 052B, 
051B, 051C, 052C and 052D). While still trying to develop the destroyer they 
need and which is capable of using modern techniques, the Navy built a dozen 
of ships in these sub-classes until reaching the quite modern 052C and the so-
called game changer, 052D. Game changer, since that is the first destroyer of 
PLAN which makes it possible to expand its area of operations further out at 
sea. “The Type 052D is a true blue water navy warship. Its hull and propulsion 
provide good seaworthiness, maneuverability and speed. Her AESA radar has 
obviously been improved with the most advanced such radar that China has 
produced”.94 They have already finished nine (planning at least 12), out of 
which three is already active: on the South China Sea. Although not connected 
to blue-water capabilities, testing and actively using these destroyers on region-
al waters can help future applicability. Type 052Ds on the South China Sea 
“sends a clear message to other claimants to disputed South China Sea is-
lands and waters that China has the power and intention of backing their 
claims with force if necessary. These vessels also act as a strong access/
area denial tool with their capable AESA radars and powerful AAW and 
ASW capabilities. With these vessels, the PLAN can create a large air 
defense umbrella over Chinese military operations and building projects 
in the region.”95 
Still talking about destroyers, they have been working on an even larger and 
powerful destroyer, the Type 055. If the 052D is the game changer, 055 is the 
joker at the PLAN, an absolute up-to-date technology: 
93 “Military Analysis: The Type 052D Class Guided Missile Destroyer.” 2016. South Front.
94 “Military Analysis…” 2016.
95 “Military Analysis…” 2016.
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“Although called a destroyer, a design displacement of over 10,000 tons 
(some sources suggest a displacement as large as 14,000 tons) would put 
the vessel into the category of a guided missile cruiser (CG). The vessel 
would most likely be designed as a fleet command vessel and powerful 
air defense platform for a future aircraft carrier strike group.”96
Frigates are also under development. Type 053-class was the first Chinese prod-
uct, copied from Soviet Riga-class. The class is still active (1497), but has several 
handicaps. The improved frigate class is the Type 054 and 054A. Two and twen-
ty-two ships have already been deployed in these classes. Type 054A-class is an 
outstanding Chinese product – though “its hull form, its engines, and most of 
its major weapons and sensors systems were directly derived from foreign models 
or technology”.98 PLAN actively uses these ships on its anti-piracy mission (more 
about this mission later on) since 2008 and no reports have arrived about engine 
failures or other mechanical problems, making it a reliable ship.
“[The Type 054A] represents an exponential improvement in the quality 
and capability of the PLAN’s frigate force, […] [it] has performed well 
handling lower intensity long-range mission In this regard, it has argu-
ably surpassed the capabilities of the French Lafayette-class frigate that 
influenced its original design [and its successor], the Type 054B will 
likely improve upon this design through. Key changes […] include larger 
hull size to accommodate equipment additions, a vertical launch system 
that is physically larger capable of launching larger missiles and holding 
more missiles […]. It is also likely that the Type 054B will use a more 
capable radar system and a longer range anti-air missile.”99
The PLAN has also introduced a new class, the corvette Type 056 class in 2012 
and already produced 25 ships100, with many more to come. Corvettes are mid-
range ships, especially built for littoral duties and anti-piracy missions – meaning 
they are not suitable for blue-water operations, might show up in a mission at the 
Guld of Aden, but the main goal is to use them on the regional seas. 
For blue-water missions, a Navy needs submarines. 
“Despite its already impressive size, the PLAN submarine fleet is one of 
the fastest growing and modernizing forces in the world, with the ONI 
estimating that the submarine force will eventually expand to include 75 
vessels. Other reports indicate that China’s submarine fleet totals up to 
70 boats, with plans to add 20 more within the next 10 years.”101 
96 “Military Analysis…” 2016.
97 “Chinese Naval Power.” 2016. South Front.
98 Collins – Erickson 2015.
99 Collins – Erickson 2015.
100 “Chinese Naval Power.” 2016.
101 “China Submarine Capabilities.” 2016.
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According to the most recent information, China has 66 active submarines, 57 
diesel attack (out of which 12 Kilo-class submarines are considered modern), 4 
nuclear attack SSN and 5 nuclear ballistic missile submarine.102 
According to the diesel submarine fleet, beside the Russian Kilo-s, there 
are several Chinese-made submarines as well, out of which the Type 039 is an 
interesting example of PLAN modernisation. They had serious problems de-
ploying the submarines, and still outdated, though they are very quiet during 
slow speed: a very famous incident occured in 2006, a Type 039 surfacing at 
a distance within firing range of the US Kitty Hawk battle group. The next 
generation is the Type 041, according to reports, as quiet as its Western (or 
Russian) counterparts, still is a station of a long road, which will lead to have 
excellent diesel submarines.
PLAN has 4 nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs), two Type 091 and 
two Type 093 class, more modern submarines. Both classes are their own prod-
ucts (there were no countries willing to sell a nuclear submarine to Beijing), 
Type 091 is way outdated. In the case of 093, even if it is a recent design, there 
are concerns about its noise-level. There are sources which claim, that its noise 
level is equal to western nuclear submarines built at the end of the seventies, 
others refuse to accept this, but according to future plans, a new hull-design 
just a few years later they introduced the class, foreshadows problems with the 
Type 093. Type 095 and 097 classes are already under planning, with the 095 
to be the one they can use in the future for possible blue-water operations, with 
more advanced and more quiet nuclear reactor. 
They have 5 SSBNs, nuclear ballistic missile submarines. They have one 
Type 092 class submarine, already out of date, and four Type 094 subma-
rines. Each of these submarines can mount 12 ballistic missiles, which allows 
China to targer parts of the US for the first time. News about the class are 
ambiguous: they can provide deterrent force, but according to the Military 
Today, the Type 094 class “boats are as noisy as Soviet submarines of the 70s, 
[while] some sources claim that these Chinese ballistic missile submarines were 
plagued with various problems and design flaws”.103 They are planning to have 
a fleet of five to ten 094 class submarines, though (of course) Type 096, the 
successor is already under development, and if there are problems, with the 
recent class, that might change the plans of the Navy. Thomas Spypek suggests 
that it is most likely that China would have four to six 096 nuclear submarines 
operational by 2020.104 According to Global Security, 
“Type 096 will be somewhat larger than the Type 094, and carry a larg-
er number of missiles, […] it will be the quietest, most heavily-armed 
submarine the Chinese Navy has ever built. The design will incorporate 
technological advancements to provide improvement in ship quieting”.105
102 “Chinese Naval Power.” 2016.
103 “Jin Class.” Military Today.
104 Skypek [é.n.].
105 “Type 096 ballistic missile submarine.” Global Security.
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Its hull will be similar to US SSBNs according to guesses. 
Summarizing the huge submarine fleet, it is visible, that the PLAN is in-
vesting a lot in the undersea fleet, but, according to analyst Ben Ho, their 
quality is still inferior: 
“The key issue is to what extent can the Chinese catch up with the Amer-
icans in the realm of undersea warfare? Opines Owen R. Cote percep-
tively in a 2011 study: <The Chinese are still far from that position, but 
as in other areas, it would almost certainly be a mistake to assume that 
they won’t eventually get there if they decide to try>.”106
A blue-water navy is non-existent without an aircraft carrier. The story of 
the ex-Varyag-now-Liaoning carrier is well known by experts interested in 
China’s military moves. The question is about the future of this type of ship 
in the PLAN. The Liaoning, with an active status, is a training ship – not 
more. And for a decent blue-water navy, they would need at least three car-
riers, beside the training ship Liaoning, in order to keep up presence at their 
marine interests. This number matches to US strategies about carriers. Du 
Wenlong, military expert 
“offered the view that one is too little, two not enough, and three might 
just meet the demand. If China had only one aircraft carrier, it would 
not conform to China’s status as a world power, nor to the demands im-
posed by the length of the coastline. Considering China’s ocean environ-
ment, two aircraft carriers are not enough to safeguard marine interests. 
If China has three aircraft carriers, they can maintain a sustained com-
bat capability: maintenance, safeguarding and patrol respectively.”107
There is an aircraft carrier-program in the Chinese Navy, but the details were 
secret for years. There were news in 2013 about a nuclear powered carrier, 
just a few weeks after they “announced” further two (beside Liaoning) carrier 
with regular engines.108 Finally Senior Colonel Yang Yujun, spokesman for the 
Ministry of National Defense of China confirmed in a news conference the 
construction of a second carrier: 
106 Ben 2015. 
107 “How many aircraft carriers should China have?” 2014. Global Times.
108 See more: Vörös 2014.
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“Relevant authority started the research and development of China’s sec-
ond aircraft carrier, which is currently under independent design and 
construction. […] The second aircraft carrier is designed independently 
by China and is being built in Dalian. It has a conventional power plant 
with a displacement of 50,000 tons. It will carry J-15 fighter jets and 
other ship-based aircraft, and the fixed-wing aircraft on-board will adopt 
ski-jump take-off mode. Various types of equipment will be installed to 
meet the needs of fulfilling its missions. The design and construction of 
the second aircraft carrier, having drawn on a lot of useful experience 
from the scientific tests and training of the first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, 
will have new improvements in many aspects.”109
Graph 4. China’s first domestic carrier under construction in Dalian shipyard 
Source: http://www.debatepolitics.com/military/ 
239422-chinas-first-domestic-carrier-under-construction.html
But we have to remember, one is too little, two is not enough, three they need 
at least. To projected active status of this soon-to-be-a-carrier hull after the sea 
trials is around 2020-2022. A possible second carrier they started to build in 
Jiangnan shipyard, though this was not confirmed so far, and it is not expected 
to have three carriers by 2030. 
With the Liaoning as a training ship, PLAN already put together China’s 
very first Carrier Battle Group and photos were made available on China-De-
fense blog. 
109 Defense Ministry’s regular press conference on Dec. 31. Ministry of National Defense, PRC, 31.12.2015.
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Graph 5. Carrier Battle Group, China 
Source: http://china-defense.blogspot.hu/2014/01/ 
photo-op-of-year-plans-1st-carrier.html
Three destroyers, three frigates, three (Type 093) submarines and an amphib-
ious assault ship (which is useless in a carrier battle group). As several analysts 
noted, the picture shows the weaknesses of the PLAN: lack of experience, miss-
ing logistics which makes the Carrier Battle Group unserviceable far from the 
ports110 and limited arms systems. 
As we have already analysed, China is about to have excellent destroyers 
and frigates, still far from such submarines and the proper carriers yet to come. 
In the case of logistic ships, China has Type 903A support ships, but they are 
small, only have a few and PLAN is using them for counter-piracy missions at 
the Gulf of Aden, as we will see. Of course they are planning the next gener-
ation of support ships, possibly in order to serve in a carrier battle group: the 
Type 901. 
“Thirty-one-and-a-half meters wide and over 200 meters long, the first 
Type 901 class supply ship will have a full displacement of around 
40,000-45,000 tons. That’s a similar size to the U.S. Navy’s 49,000-ton 
Supply class replenishment ships, which can carry over 17,000 tons of jet 
and ship fuel, and 1950 tons of ammunition.”111
110 “The true secret to American naval power is not the numerous and powerful front-line warships, but 
the less visually impressive vessels that you rarely see on TV or read about in the news. They are 
logistics ships, including tankers, dry stores vessels and ammunition ships. The Pentagon’s three-doz-
en active combat-support vessels, manned mostly by civilian mariners, busily crisscross the globe, 
carefully plotting their courses to regularly meet up with the carriers and other task forces in order 
to refuel and resupply them. Without logistics ships, the U.S. Navy would never venture far from its 
major home ports in Virginia, Florida, California and Hawaii. These vital but unattractive supply vessels 
occasionally enjoy the privilege of appearing in carrier battle group photo ops.” “China Flaunts First 
Carrier Battle Group Photo Op.” 2014. War is boring.
111 “Giant New Supply Ship Extends China’s Reach at Sea.” 2015. Popular Science.
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Graph 6. Type 901 
Source: http://htka.hu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/type_901.jpg
As we could see China has steadily modernized its navy over the past decades in 
order to have Blue-water Navy capabilities (of course beside the aim of having 
a Navy which can control and dominate the countries regional seas). They al-
ready have, or are planning ships which are on par with western navies, though 
finishing the process still take one or two decades. As David Axe noted on War 
is Boring: PLAN “acquired a lot of new equipment in recent years but is still 
learning and growing – and still trails the U.S. Navy by nautical miles.”112
Implications on the future
When trying to project the steps by PLAN, the presence at the Gulf of Aden 
and the waters off Somali coast does help a lot. The United Nations Security 
Council adopted several resolutions (before and in 2008) calling on all coun-
tries to help patrol the gulf and waters off Somalia, where piracy has endan-
gered shipping in one of the world’s busiest sea lanes. Beijing was among the 
first states to react – sending a Task Force to the region. 
The PLAN’s participation is juicy at first sight: they are acting unilaterally, 
but parallel with international groups and efforts. As Andrew Erickson and 
Austin Strange noted, 
“multilateral coordination mechanisms have enabled China to main-
tain its status as an independent public goods provider while actively 
strengthening bilateral naval relations and helping build a 21st-century 
architecture for global maritime governance”.113 
This means that they are operating separately from international task forces 
in the region, like Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO’s Operation 
Ocean Shield or the EU’s Operation Atalanta, but they are closely cooperating 
with these forces. This type of participation is not unique, beside China, India, 
Japan and Russia also decided to join in this way.
112 “China Flaunts First Carrier Battle Group Photo Op.” 2014.
113 Erickson – Strange 2013.
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The first Chinese naval escort Taskforce left in 2008, and the participation 
is so successful, that on the 7th April 2016, already the 23rd Taskforce had left 
for the Gulf of Aden and off Somali coast.114
Usually these Taskforces are consisted of three ships: 2 destroyers or frig-
ates (in most of the cases, 1-1 from each type) and a support ship. Two Type 
054A frigates and a Type 903A support ship left the Chinese port Zhouzhan 
in April. 
According to the Chinese news agency, the former 22 Taskforces 
“have provided escort for 6,139 Chinese and foreign merchant ships in 
922 batches. Besides, they have fulfilled various missions successfully 
including providing escort for the evacuation of Chinese nationals from 
Libya and ships transporting Syria’s chemical weapons in the Mediter-
ranean Sea, offering emergency water supply assistance to Maldives and 
evacuating Chinese and foreign personnel from conflict-jolted Yemen.”115
So what are the implications on the future? 
First of all, these Taskforces and the operation of the PLAN in the region 
are the signs of capacity-improvement. These missions and the time spent on 
international waters will consent to a successful development, providing in-
valuable information for the Navy.
Secondly, their independent participation might be worrying, but we have 
to note one thing: “PLAN’s coordination with Western antipiracy forces sug-
gests that China can contribute in parallel with, rather than threaten to desta-
bilize, existing maritime governance mechanisms in the Far Seas.”116 So even 
if the will to develop an independent and well-equipped navy is there, the 
possibility is still there to have China as a cooperative partner in international 
missions.
Conclusion
China depends on preventing trade routes – in order to be able to pursuit eco-
nomic growth through exporting goods, and to import the much needed ener-
gy. At present, Beijing lacks the naval power necessary to protect its sea lines of 
communication: they fear that during an international security crisis the main 
maritime routes could be in danger, which would endanger their economy. 
The country has a few options to react on this possible threat, like cooper-
ating with international actors, states and organizations, but as a parallel activ-
ity, they are about to develop a navy that can maintain presence at important 
chokepoints, can react on possible incidents, and is able to defend Chinese 
interests.
114 “23rd Chinese naval escort taskforce leaves for mission.” 2016. Chinmil.com.cn
115 Ibid.
116 Erickson – Strange 2013.
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The modernizing steps are clearly implicating the directions of the devel-
opment: to develop blue-water capacities within the Chinese Navy. How and 
what they are developing, where and how they are cooperating and testing 
their techniques, shows, their ultimate goal is to gain this power – in the fu-
ture. This project is definitely not a short-term commitment, they can only 
have successes in the mid- and long-run and by navy-standards, they have just 
started to act.
But Beijing should not forget, having a powerful navy is not equal with 
safety, and bigger power might come with more threats and can create wider 
uncertainty. 
Maybe that is why, the PLAN started a world-tour: the 21st Taskforce, 
after finishing its actual mission at the coasts of Somalia, left for a global re-
lationship-building tour in Africa, Europe, US and Asia. A Type 052C guid-
ed-missile destroyer, a Type 054A guided-missile frigate and a Type 903 fleet 
oiler support ship visited Sudan, Egypt, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the US 
and Indonesia as a goodwill project. 
Graph 7. A Type 052C destroyer (152) in Finland 
Source: yle.fi
Beside working on partnerships, the global tour can also advertise: World, we 
are coming to the oceans.  
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